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Formal specification and analysis of requirements continues to gain support as a method
for producing more reliable software. However, the introduction of formal methods to a large
software project is difficult, due in part to the unfamiliarity of the specification languages
and the lack of graphics. This paper reports results of an investigation into the effectiveness
of formal methods as an aid to the requirements analysis of critical, system-level fault-
protection software on a spacecraft currently under development. Our experience indicates
that formal specification and analysis can enhance the accuracy of the requirements and add
assurance prior to design development in this domain.
The work described here is part of a larger, NASA-funded research project whose purpose
is to use formal-methods techniques to improve the quality of software in space applications
[2]. The demonstration project described here is part of the effort to evaluate experimen-
tally the effectiveness of supplementing traditional engineering approaches to requirements
specification with the more rigorous specification and analysis available with formal methods.
The approach taken in this investigation was to:
1. Select the application domain. The primary criteria were, first, to select portions of the
requirements of an large, embedded software project currently under development, and,
secondly, to select mission-critical software, meaning that its failure could jeopardize
the spacecraft system or mission.
The selected applications were the requirements for portions of the Cassini spacecraft's
system-level fault-protection software. This on-board software autonomously detects
and responds to faults that occur during operations. About 85 pages of documented
requirements describing the software that commands the spacecraft to a known safe
*First author's mailing address is Dept. of Computer Science, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011.
tSecond author's mailing address is Space Station Systems Division, NEC Corporation, 4035 Ikebe-cho,
Midori-ku, Yokohama 226, Japan. This work was performed while the author was a visiting researcher at
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA 91109.
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state and a software executive that manages the fault protection were involved in the
study. System-level fault protection was targeted as a domain which merited the extra
assurance possible with formal specification and analysis.
2. Model the selected applications using object-oriented diagrams. The object-oriented
modeling tool used in this work was Paradigm Plus, an implementation of OMT, the
Object Modeling Technique [6] 1. This effort built on earlier work in this research
project in which OMT diagrams were found to be a useful complement to formal
specification in a reverse-engineering application [1]. Our work differs in that we applied
OMT to software currently in the process of being developed, with formal proofs as
well as formal specifications being created.
3. Develop formal specifications. The formal specification language used in this study
was that of PVS, the Prototype Verification System [8]. PVS is an integrated environ-
ment for developing and analyzing formal specifications including support tools and a
theorem prover.
4. Prove required properties. We determined properties that must hold for the target
software to be hazard-free and function correctly, specified them in PVS as lemmas
(claims), and proved or disproved them using the interactive theorem-prover.
5. Feedback results to the Project. Because we were analyzing requirements that were
still being updated, part of our task was to keep current with the changes and to
provide timely feedback to the Project as they resolved the remaining requirements
issues and began design development.
The experiment described here produced 25 pages of PVS specifications and 15 pages of
OMT diagrams. 37 lemmas were specified. Of these, 21 were proven to be true and 3 were
disproven. An additional 13 lemmas were stated but not proven. Five of these unproven
lemmas were obviously true from the formal specifications; four were out of the scope of
our application; and four remain to be proven. The lemmas that were proved were claims
or challenges which must be true if the specifications are accurate and the requirements are
hazard-free.
The lemmas were divided into three categories: requirements-met, safety, and liveness
properties. Requirements-met lemmas traced the documented requirements to the formal
specifications. For example, a documented requirement "If a response can be initiated by
more than one monitor, each monitor shall include an enable/disable mechanism" led to
a lemma demonstrating that the specifications satisfied this requirement. We proved or
disproved 10 such requirements-met lemmas.
Safety properties were "shall-not" claims, which can be stated informally as "nothing
bad ever happens [9]." Examples are, "The software shall not activate any response that
is not requested by a monitor" and "The response shall not change the instrument's status
during a critical sequence of commands." We were able to prove 7 such safety properties,
adding assur_.nce that the software did not introduce hazards into the system.
1Paradigm Plus is a registered trademark of Protosoft, Inc.
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Liveness properties described the positive aspects of the correct behavior of the software:
"something good eventually happens [9]." Examples are, "If a response has the highest
priority among the candidates and does not finish in the current cycle, it will be active in
the next cycle" and "If the response occurs during a non-critical sequence of commands,
then the instrument is turned on." We proved 7 such liveness properties, adding assurance
that no hidden assumptions were required for the software to function correctly.
The results obtained from the specification and analysis (including proofs) of the require-
ments were of two types: issues found in the requirements and an evaluation of the process
itself.
A total of 37 issues were found in the requirements. These were categorized as follows:
• Undocumented assumptions: 11. The formalization of the requirements revealed sev-
eral assumptions that were not explicit in the documentation. An example of such an
assumption is, "if the spacecraft is in a critical attitude, then the software is executing
a critical sequence of commands." Frequently, these assumptions involved interface
issues between software modules or subsystems, historically a frequent source of errors
that persist until system testing [4]. In almost every case, the hidden assumption was
currently correct. However, several assumptions merited documentation, especially
since future changes can invalidate current assumptions.
Inadequate requirements for off-nominal or boundary cases: 10. These issues usually
involved unlikely scenarios in which a pre-condition could be false. We often had to
consult spacecraft engineers to know whether such boundary cases were credible. For
example, the case in which several monitors with the same priority level detect faults
in the same cycle was not described. By concretely specifying the possibility of off-
nominal scenarios, the formal analysis can contribute added robustness to the system.
Traceability and inconsistency: 9. These issues included lack of traceability between
the high-level requirements and low-level requirements, as well as inconsistency between
the software requirements and the design of subsystems. Many of these issues were
significant in that they could affect both the logic and the correctness of the formal
specifications. An example is that although the high-level requirements assume that
multiple detections of faults occuring within the response time of the first fault detected
are symptoms of the original fault, the lower-level requirements (correctly) cancel a
lower-priority fault response to handle a higher-priority response.
Imprecise terminology: 6. These were documentation issues, frequently involving syn-
onyms or related terms. The definition of types in PVS enforced their resolution.
Logical error: 1. The logical error involved the handling of a request for service from a
monitor in the case that a higher-priority request occurred. The question as to whether
such a request could face starvation was first raised during the initial close reading.
The formalization of the issue as a lemma which could be disproven provided insight
and certainty.
The evaluation of the process we used to specify and analyze the requirements led us to
three conclusions:
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Using object-oriented models. For the target applications, object-oriented modeling
offered several advantages as an initial step in developing formal specifications. First,
the object-oriented modeling defined the boundaries and interfaces of the embedded
software applications at the level of abstraction chosen as appropriate by the specifiers.
In addition, the modeling offered a quick way to gain multiple perspectives on the
requirements. Finally, the graphical diagrams served as a frame upon which to base
the subsequent formal specification and guided the steps of its development. Since
the elements of the diagrammatic model often mapped in a straightforward way to
elements of the formal specifications, this reduced the effort involved in producing an
initial formal specification. We also found that the object-oriented models did not
always represent the "why," of the requirements, i.e., the underlying intent or strategy
of the software. In contrast, the formal specification often clearly revealed the intent
of the requirements.
Using formal methods for requirements analysis. Unlike earlier work in this research
project on software in which the requirements were very mature and stable and the
formal specification entailed reverse engineering (Space Shuttle's Jet Select Subsystem),
the work on Cassini's fault-protection subsystem analyzed requirements at a much
earlier phase of development. Consequently, the requirements that we analyzed were
known to be in flux, with several key issues still being worked (e.g., timing details,
number of priority levels). A negative effect of the lack of stability was that time was
spent staying current with changes. A positive effect was that issues identified during
our analysis could be readily fed back into the development process before the design
was frozen.
We were concerned as to whether it was a waste of time to formally specify requirements
while they were still likely to change. Certainly, there was inefficiency in rewriting
specifications to conform to changes that occurred during the experiment. However,
based on our experience with this trial project, the formal specification of unstable
requirements had the following advantages:
• Laid the foundation for future work.
• Allowed rapid review of proposed changes and alternatives.
• Clarified requirements issues still being worked by elevating undocumented con-
cerns to clear, objective dilemmas.
• Complemented the lower-level FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) al-
ready being perfomed on the software, by providing higher-level verification of
system properties.
• Added confidence in the adequacy of the requirements that had been analyzed
using formal methods.
Rushby's recent study of formal methods for airborne systems reached the similar but
even stronger conclusion that formal methods can be most effectively applied early in
the lifecycle [7].
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. Using formal methods for safety-critical software. For a safety analysis it is important
to ensure that a hazardous situation does not occur, as well as that the correct behavior
does occur [5]. Fault Tree Analysis, which backtracks from a hazard to its possible
causes, is one method used for this kind of hazards analysis [3]. However, unlike formal
methods of specification and proof, Fault Tree Analysis is an informal method which
in practice permits ambiguous or inadequate descriptions.
Formal methods helped us find hazardous scenarios by forcing us to show every con-
dition and prompting us to define new, undocumented assumptions. The process of
developing formal specifications and proofs led us to think about the full range of cases,
some of which were unanticipated.
In conclusion, one of the goals of the larger research project within which this inves-
tigation was performed is to evaluate the effectiveness and practicality of formal methods
for enhancing the development process and the reliability of the end product. Our main
contributions to this work in the Cassini demonstration project have been:
• Applying formal methods to the software requirements analysis of a project currently
under development,
• Using object-oriented diagrams to guide the formal specification of software require-
ments,
• Formally specifying and proving a set of properties essential for the correct and hazard-
free behavior of the software, and
• Demonstrating that formal methods can be used to specify and analyze an application
involving critical software.
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im, ll Introduction
• Task is part of NASA RTOP to demonstrate
Formal Methods techniques and their
applicability to critical NASA software systems.
(RTOP: Research Technical Objectives and
Plans)
• Formal Methods (FM) refer to the use of
techniques and tools based on formal logic and
mathematics to specify and verify systems,
software, and hardware.
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 mO$1 Approach
• Step 1: Select Application
_> Criteria: • Software requirements
• Currently under development
(critical software failure could
jeopardize system or mission)
>> Selection: • Requirements for portions of Cassini
spacecraft's system-level fault protection
software
• Autonomous detection, isolation, and
recovery from on-board faults required
ExperienceRelx_
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CDS Fault Protection
CDS Interfaces to SFP-2
TKB 6/15/94
CDEA
System
Fault I-_
Protection 6
1 Telemetry 4& 5
2 Uplink CDS Fault
3 Time Services Protection
11 Memory Loading
and SSR dual
recording
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, Bus
_._ EngineeringSubsystems ]
"_ PROBE I
l Instruments t
6 State Monitor and Control
7 Commanding
8 S/C Intercommunication RT
Reception
9 S/C Intercommunication RT
Transmission
10 Dual recording (from both PSAs to
both SSRs)
CDS Critical Design Review 12-73
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immll Approach (continued)
• Safe State Response
_>Mission-phase dependent
>>Commands safe attitude, minimizes power usage,
cancels non-essential activities, reconfigures
hardware
• Fault Recovery Executive
>>Selects which request to service
>_Preemptive priority scheme
>>Special cases complicate requirements
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CDS Fault Protection
SFP Model (Conceptual)
"CDS"
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-lPL CDS System Fault Protection Monitor and Response Tree
17,;o lU i
Response I
Nn+ r
_ Responses
IIIlll Approach (continued)
• Step 2: Model with Object-Oriented Diagrams
)) Builds on earlier RTOP work [Cheng and
Auernheimer, 93]
)> Object Modeling Technio_e (OMT) tool [Rumbaugh,
et. al., 91], Paradigm Plust_) [Protosoft]
• Step 3: Develop formaI specifications
)> OMT diagrams guided specification
)> Formal specification language was that of PVS
(Prototype Verification System) [Shanker, Owre,
Rushby, 93]
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1 ) CAS-3-331 dated Jan.28 says that only cancelled responses have their requests cleared.
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 Jmll Approach (continued)
• Step 4: Prove required properties
>>Specify properties in PVS as claims to be proven
>>Prove/disprove claims using interactive theorem
prover
• Step 5: Feedback results to Cassini Project
RRLYA
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• Summary: 15 pages of OMT diagrams
25 pages of PVS specifications
37 properties specified as claims
• 24 proven/disproven
• 5 true from specifications
• 4 out of scope
• 4 remain to prove
• Two types of results:
>>Issues found in documented requirements
>>Evaluation of process
_MIl Results: Issues Found
.J_L
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3 categories of claims specified and proven
>>"Requirements-met"
• Demonstrate that formal specifications accurately
represent key requirements
• Example: "If a response can be initiated by more than
one monitor, each monitor shall include an enable/
disable mechanism."
• 10 proven/disproven, adding assurance that
specifications are correct
>>Safety properties
• "Shall-not" claims that "nothing bad ever happens"
[Win_ 90]
• Example: "The response shall not change the
instrument's status during a critical sequence of
commands."
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 mmB Results: Issues Found (continued)
Experlence Repo.
RRL. YA
1_J94
$
>>Safety properties (continued)
• 7 proven, adding assurance that software does not
introduce hazards into system
• Example: "The response shall not change the
instrument's status during a critical sequence of
commands."
>>Liveness properties
• Describe correct behavior: "something good eventually
happens" [_Ving, 90]
• Example: "If a response has the highest priority among
the candidates and does not finish in the current cycle,
it will be active in the next cycle."
• 7 proven/disproven, adding assurance that no hidden
assumptions required for correct behavior
saf: THEORY
% Example below is excerpted from saf theory.
% Spacecraft saflng commands the AACS to homebase mode, thereby
% stopping delta-v's and desats.
BEGIN
aacs mode: TYPE = {homebase, de=umble}
attitude: TYPE
cds Internal request: VAR bool
critical attitude: VAR bool
prev aacsmode: VAR aacs_mode
aacs_stopfnc (critical attitude, cds internal request, prev_aacs_mode):aacs mode . - - -
IF cri=ical attitude
THEN IF _ds_internai_request
THEN prey aacs mode
ELSE homebase -
ENDIT
ELSE homebase
ENDIF
% Lemma asserts that if Spacecraft Safing is requested via a CDS internal
% request while the spacecraft is in a critical attitude, then no change is
% commanded to the AACS. Otherwise, the AACS is commanded to homebase.
aacs-s a fIng_re q_me t_l : LEMMA
(cri_Ical_attltude AND cds Internal request)
OR (aacs stop fnc(critical-a_titude_ cds internal request, prev_aacs_mode)
- homebase) - -- -
END saf
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 mlli Results: Issues Found (continued)
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37 issues found:
)) Undocumented assumptions: 11
• Example: "If the spacecraft is in a critical attitude, then
the software is executing a critical sequence of
commands."
• Frequently involved interface issues, historically a
source of errors that persist until integration and
system testing [Lutz, 93]
• Assumptions almost always currently correct, but
future design changes could invalidate them.
)) Inadequate requirements for off-nominal or boundary
cases: 10
• Example: Requirements for case in which several
monitors with same priority level detect faults in same
cycle were not described
il[Bll Results: Issues Found (continued)
)_ Inadequate requirements for off-nominal or boundary
cases (continued)
• Involved unlikely scenarios in which pre-condition
could be false
• Concretely specifying possible cases builds in
robustness
)_ Traceability and inconsistency: 9
• Example: High-level requ/rements assume that
detected faults occurring during response time of initial
fault are symptoms of initial fault; low-level
requirements (correctly) cancel lower-priority response
• Formal specification forced resolution of discrepancies
.JILL
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_B'm Results: Issues Found (continued)
_ Imprecise terminology: 6
• Example: "Stop" and "cancel" sometimes synonymous;
sometimes not
• Automatic type checking enforced precision
_ Logical error: 1
• Example: can a request for service face starvation due
to higher-priority requests?
• Formalizing question as lemma which could be
disproven provided insight and certainty
RR_ YA
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• Benefits of combining Object-Oriented Models
and Formal Methods
_ Frames the problem
_ Basis for technical discussion
_ Road map
• Mapping of elements
• Reduced effort
_ Complementary roles
• OMT: informal
multiple perspectives
communicates key elements
• PVS: formal
unambiguous specification
analysis of completeness
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_mlll Results: Process Evaluation
(continued)
)_ OO model did not represent the "why" of the
requirements (underlying intent or strategy) as clearly
as the formal specifications
• Using Formal Methods for requirements
analysis
_ Requirements were not yet stable
)_ Waste of time to formally specify?
• Time consuming to stay current
• Interactive process
.JILL
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_mlll Results: Process Evaluation
(continued)
.B_L
R_k YA
14
)_Advantages of formal specification of unstable
requirements
• Laid foundation
• Rapid review of proposed changes
• Clarified issues being worked: undocumented
concerns elevated to clear, objective dilemmas
• Complemented lower-level FMEAs (Failure Modes and
Effects Analyses)
• Added confidence in adequacy of requirements
analyzed using formal methods
• Issues identified fed back and resolved early in
development
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 'Mll Results: Process Evaluation
(continued)
• Using Formal Methods for safety-critical
software
_>FM helped find hazardous situations
>_Forced analysis of full range of cases, some
unanticipated
7_Prompted definition of undocumented assumptions,
some of which are not always true
77Proofs of safety properties ensured that some unsafe
states do not occur
EXl_rie nee Report
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 mMll Conclusion
Contributions of this work:
77Applied FM to software requirements of project
currently in development
7>Used object-oriented diagrams to guide formal
specifications of requirements
>7Formally specified and proved some properties
essential for correct and hazard-free behavior
>7Demonstrated use of FM in safety-critical application
Experience Repert
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